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THE DUE PROCESS MANDATE AND THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ADMIRALTY
ARRESTS AND ATTACHMENTS
PURSUANT TO SUPPLEMENTAL
RULES B AND C
I.

INRODUCTION

In the past decade, the area of procedural due process, including
traditional doctrines of in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction, has
undergone a constitutional facelift. As a result, two of admiralty's
most extraordinary features-maritime attachment and garnishment and actions in rem'-have been questioned from a constitutional standpoint.
The United States Supreme Court inaugurated the new era with
its decision in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.2 In that case, the
Court first began changing its procedural due process philosophy
by broadening its conception of constitutionally protected forms of
property. Having narrowly addressed itself to the question of what
constitute constitutionally protectible property interests, a further
inquiry arose and demanded resolution. Given the existence of a
protectible property interest, the particular form of protection due
process demands would have to be determined.
The Court responded to this question in Fuentes v. Shevin' and
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.I In those and subsequent decisions, the
Court struggled to define the parameters of procedural due process
in the context of prejudgment attachment and garnishment and
replevin statutes. None of the issues addressed in the
Sniadach-Mitchell line, however, have arisen in a strictly admiralty context. The maritime prejudgment attachment procedure
currently provided for in Supplemental Rule B 5 is, however, simi1.
TIME

See

FED.

R. Civ. P.,

SUPPLEMENTAL RULES FOR CERTAIN ADMIRALTY AND MARI-

CLAIMs, Supplemental Rules B and C.

2. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
3. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
4. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).

5. Supplemental Rule B provides as follows:
(1) When available; complaint, affidavit, and process. With respect to

any admiralty or maritime claim in personam a verified complaint may
contain a prayer for process to attach the defendant's goods and chattels,

or credits and effects in the hands of garnishees named in the complaint to
the amount sued for, if the defendant shall not be found within the district.
Such a complaint shall be accompanied by an affidavit signed by the plain421
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lar, if not identical in purpose, to those held unconstitutional in
both Sniadach and Fuentes-it exists for purposes of facilitating
a court's rightful assertion of jurisdiction over particular parties,
and it provides potential security for the satisfaction of underlying
claims. Further, both Supplemental Rules B and C,1 covering actiff or his attorney that, to the affiant's knowledge, or to the best of his
information and belief, the defendant cannot be found within the district.
When a verified complaint is supported by such an affidavit the clerk shall
forthwith issue a summons and process of attachment and garnishment. In
addition, or in the alternative, the plaintiff may, pursuant to Rule 4(e),
invoke the remedies provided by state law for attachment and garnishment
or similar seizure of the defendant's property. Except for Rule E(8) these
Supplemental Rules do not apply to state remedies so invoked.
(2) Notice to defendant. No judgment by default shall be entered except
upon proof, which may be by affidavit, (a) that the plaintiff or the garnishee
has given notice of the action to the defendant by mailing to him a copy of
the complaint, summons, and process of attachment or garnishment, using
any form of mail requiring a return receipt, or (b) that the complaint,
summons, and process of attachment or garnishment have been served on
the defendant in a manner authorized by Rule 4(d) or (i), or (c) that the
plaintiff or the garnishee has made diligent efforts to give notice of the
action to the defendant and has been unable to do so.
(3) Answer.
(a) By garnishee. The garnishee shall serve his answer, together with
answers to any interrogatories served with the complaint, within 20 days
after service of process upon him. Interrogatories to the garnishee may be
served with the complaint without leave of court. If the garnishee refuses
or neglects to answer on oath as to the debts, credits, and effects that may
be propounded by the plaintiff, the court may award compulsory process
against him. If he admits any debts, credits, or effects, they shall be held
in his hands or paid into the registry of the court, and shall be held in either
case subject to the further order of the court.
(b) By defendant. The defendant shall serve his answer within 30 days
after process has been executed, whether by attachment of property or
service on the garnishee.
6. Supplemental Rule C provides as follows:
(1) When available. An action in rem may be brought:
(a) To enforce any maritime lien;
(b) Whenever a statute of the United States provides for a maritime
action in rem or a proceeding analogous thereto.
Except as otherwise provided by law a party who may proceed in rem may
also, or in the alternative, proceed in personam against any person who may
be liable.
Statutory provisions exempting vessels or other property owned or possessed by or operated by or for the United States from arrest or seizure are
not affected by this rule. When a statute so provides, an action against the
United States or an instrumentality thereof may proceed on in rem principles.

Spring 1979]

DUE PROCESS MANDATE

tions in rem, arguably lack necessary constitutional safeguards
discussed in Mitchell and subsequent decisions.
(2) Complaint. In actions in rem the complaint shall be verified on oath
or solemn affirmation. It shall describe with reasonable particularity the
property that is the subject of the action and state that it is within the
district or will be during the pendency of the action. In actions for the
enforcement of forfeitures for violation of any statute of the United States
the complaint shall state the place of seizure and whether it was on land or
on navigable waters, and shall contain such allegations as may be required
by the statute pursuant to which the action is brought.
(3) Process. Upon the filing of the complaint the clerk shall forthwith
issue a warrant for the arrest of the vessel or other property that is the
subject of the action and deliver it to the marshal for service. If the property
that is the subject of the action consists in whole or in part of freight, or
the proceeds of property sold, or other intangible property, the clerk shall
issue a summons directing any person having control of the funds to show
cause why they should not be paid into court to abide the judgment.
(4) Notice. No notice other than the execution of the process is required
when the property that is the subject of the action has been released in
accordance with Rule E(5). If the property is not released within 10 days
after execution of process, the plaintiff shall promptly or within such time
as may be allowed by the court cause public notice of the action and arrest
to be given in a newspaper of general circulation in the district, designated
by order of the court. Such notice shall specify the time within which the
answer is required to be filed as provided by subdivision (6) of this Rule.
This rule does not affect the requirements of notice in actions to foreclose
a preferred ship mortgage pursuant to the Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 250, §
30, as amended.
(5) Ancillary process. In any action in rem in which process has been
served as provided by this rule, if any part of the property that is the subject
of the action has not been brought within the control of the court because
it has been removed or sold, or because it is intangible property in the hands
of a person who has not been served with process, the court may, on motion,
order any person having possession or control of such property or its proceeds to show cause why it should not be delivered into the custody of the
marshal or paid into court to abide the judgment; and, after hearing, the
court may enter such judgment as law and justice may require.
(6) Claim and answer; interrogatories. The claimant of property that is
the subject of an action in rem shall file his claim within 10 days after
process has been executed, or within such additional time as may be allowed by the court, and shall serve his answer within 20 days after the filing
of the claim. The claim shall be verified on oath or solemn affirmation, and
shall state the interest in the property by virtue of which the claimant
demands its restitution and the right to defend the action. If the claim is
made on behalf of the person entitled to possession by an agent, bailee, or
attorney, it shall state that he is duly authorized to make the claim. At the
time of answering, the claimant shall also serve answers to any interrogatories served with the complaint. In actions in rem interrogatories may be so
served without leave of court.
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Almost simultaneously, new concern about the constitutional
validity of certain of the Supplemental Rules has arisen in another
context, with the Supreme Court's more recent decision in Shaffer
v. Heitner.7 Under Shaffer, the mere presence of property within
the territorial bounds of a court's jurisdiction is no longer a prima
facie sufficient basis for the actual assertion of its jurisdiction.
Again, while not decided in an admiralty context, the Shaffer decision could have a limiting effect on admiralty quasi in rem procedures as provided for in Supplemental Rule B, especially when a
court asserts its jurisdiction based solely upon the fortuitous presence of property within the territorial bounds of its jurisdiction.
The constitutionality of Supplemental Rules B and C has been
undoubtedly placed in issue. The more pertinent inquiry, and one
less susceptible of a definitive response, is whether, Rules B and
C can withstand constitutional challenge in light of decisions such
as Mitchell and Shaffer.
II.

BACKGROUND

Prior to 1966, admiralty cases were docketed and heard on a
separate "side" of federal district court. Additionally, and based
largely on tradition, special terminology and procedure were utilized. Particularly notable was the fact that admiralty libels' were
of two types: in personam and in rem."
An in personam suit is against a named individual or corporate
person, asserting a personal liability. 0 When a plaintiff has an in
personam claim enforceable within the admiralty jurisdiction, he
is permitted to attach the defendant's goods or chattels, or credits
and effects in the hands of garnishees." The prerequisites to such
an attachment are: (1) that the defendant cannot be found within
the territorial bounds of the district in which the action is comm7. 433 U.S. 195, 97 S. Ct. 2589 (1977).
8. He that has a maritime suit to prosecute, sets forth, in writing addressed to the court or the judge of the court, his cause of action circumstantially and intelligibly, with simplicity and conciseness, and closes with a

prayer for the relief which he desires. This is called a libel, from the Latin

libellus, a little book.
BENEDICr, THE LAW OF AMERICAN ADMIRALTY 48 (6th ed. 1940). The libel was the
equivalent of today's complaint.
9. GILMORE & BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 35 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter
cited as GILMORE & BLACK]. Even though the term "libel" has been dropped, the
distinction, of course, remains.
10. Id.
11. Id. Supplemental Rule B governs this procedure.
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enced;' 2 (2) that goods or credits of the defendant are presently
within the district, or alternatively, that they will soon be within
the district; and (3) that there are no statutory or general maritime
law proscriptions against the attachment.'"
Maritime suits in rem, on the other hand, are virtually unknown
outside admiralty jurisdiction. 4 Such actions may be brought to
enforce maritime liens and "[w]henever a statute of the United
States provides for a maritime action in rem or a proceeding analogous thereto."' 5 Maritime liens can arise as a result of maritime
tort, breach of maritime contract, act of salvage, and general average." A plaintiff attempting to enforce such a lien may proceed
directly against the vessel or other property in which it subsists.
12. Plaintiff or his attorney attests to the fact that the defendant cannot be
found within the district by filing, along with the complaint, "an affidavit...
that, to the affiant's knowledge, or to the best of his information and belief, the
defendant cannot be found within the district." See Supplemental Rule B, note
5 supra.
13. For example, actions under the Suits in Admiralty Act may not be commenced by arrest or seizure of property. In addition, since there is no personal
liability in suits on bottomry bonds, such actions may be brought only in rem.
See 7A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE B.03 [hereinafter cited as 7A MOORE'S]; 16
U.S.C. § 741 et. seq. (1970); ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ADMIRALTY RULES, PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURTS, H.R. Doc. No. 391, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 68-69 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as ADVISORY COMMIrrTEE NOTES].

14. While the maritime action in rem is by far the more colorful of the lot, in
rem actions will lie in other areas of the law, including: suits to quiet title, Empire
Ranch & Cattle Co. v. Herrick, 124 P. 748 (Colo. 1912); actions to foreclose real
estate mortgages, Pettis v. Johnston, 190 P. 681 (Okl. 1920); and suits in partition, Sandiford v. Town of Hempstead, 90 N.Y.S. 76 (1904). Actions in rem are
generally said to give rise to judgments declaratory of the "status" of some
subject-matter, whether this be a person or a thing.
15. Supplemental Rule C(1).
16. McCreary, Going for the Jugular Vein: Arrests and Attachments in
Admiralty, 28 OHIO ST.L.J. 19, 25 n.45 (1967).
The only common tort situation involving ships which does not give rise to
a lien is injury to or death of a seaman caused by his employer's negligence.
Then the only remedy is under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, 41 Stat. 1007
(1920), which does not support a lien. Plamals v. S.S. Pinar Del Rio, 277
U.S. 151 (1928). Cf. Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964). The
only common contract situation involving ships which does not give rise to
a lien for a breach is a shipbuilding contract which is not regarded as a
maritime contract. .

.

.Speaking generally, a maritime lien does not de-

pend on possession, nor on recording, and cannot be divested except by the
giving of other security, by judicial sale, or by laches in enforcement.
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This action constitutes the suit in rem-"against the thing. '
Upon the filing of the complaint in rem in any district in which
the ship"8 is found, the marshal is ordered to take the ship into
custody. Notice of the in rem action must be given by publication
so that other claimants may intervene;"9 and an owner whose ship
is libeled in rem may procure her release on the posting of a substitution bond with approved surety. If plaintiff prevails on the merits of his action, the bond is forfeited in the amount of his claim.
If the amount of the bond exceeds the value of plaintiff's claim,
the additional proceeds go to other valid maritime lienholders who
have intervened. 0 The balance, if any, goes to the owner. Of
greater importance, however, is that judicial sales arising out of
successful actions in rein confer a title good against the world; the
title transferred is not merely that of the owner 2 and thereby subject to his creditors. 2
The first real "codification" of the attachment and garnishment
and in rem procedures occurred in 1844 with the promulgation of
the Supreme Court Admiralty Rules.2 Prior to 1844, circuit and
district courts varied considerably in their treatment of these procedures. With the advent of the 1844 Rules, maritime practice was
4
made uniform in this regard.2
17.

GILMORE & BLAcK, supra note 9 at 36.

18. The tangible item attached is not always a vessel; for example, the ship's
claim for freight creates a lien in the cargo carried. See In re One Hundred and
Fifty-one Tons of Coal, 18 Fed. Cas. 702, No. 10,520 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1859).
19. Supplemental Rule C(4).
20. Priority among competing maritime liens of the same type is determined by the time of their attachment, but in inverse order: last in time is
first in right. The inverse order rule has become riddled with exceptions,
but it is still basic to maritime lien theory. There is also an involved system
of priorities among different types of liens, some being of higher rank than
others.
GILMORE & BLAcK, supra note 9 at 588.

21. Id. at 37; see also The Trenton, 4 F. 657 (E.D.Mich. 1880).
22. In personam arrests and attachments, and subsequent executions
pursuant to judgments obtained in such proceedings, do not extinguish
valid maritime liens .... Proper in rem proceedings . . . do have the

effect of extinguishing all other liens. It also seems necessarily to follow that
in personam attachments or arrests create no priority over, nor extinguish,
previously properly secured terrestrial liens.
7A MOORE'S, supra note 13 at B.03, n.1.
23. Effective September 1, 1845. The Supreme Court Admiralty Rules of 1844
can be found in 44 U.S. (3 How.) ix-xix.
24. See 7A MooRE's, supra note 13 at B.02, n.8.
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The 1844 Rules were revised and replaced by the Supreme Court
in 1920,2 without substantial change to the attachment and in rem
provisions. In addition, admiralty practice during the first half of
the twentieth century was also governed by statutes, written rules
of practice formulated by each district court, and "settled admiralty practice," referring to practice decisions under the Civil law
tradition which American admiralty courts had been following
since 1789.26
Between 1920 and 1961, there were a number of additions to and
revisions of the Rules by the Supreme Court.2 7 By 1961, and at the
instigation of the Court,'2 the Advisory Committee on the General
Admiralty Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States
had recommended the adoption by the Court of eleven new Admiralty Rules, and several amendments to then current Civil Rules
regarding depositions and discovery matters. 9
The formal unification of the Civil and Admiralty Rules took
place in 1966. 31 The Court extended the Civil Rules to cases in
admiralty and added the six Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims that carried forward procedures
unique to the admiralty practice . 3 "The admonition in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2073 that rules promulgated by the Supreme Court should 'not
abridge or modify any substantive right,' and a proper desire to
preserve unique features of the former admiralty practice, are the

basis for the Supplemental Rules ....*"32

25. Rules of Practice for the Courts of the United States in Admiralty and
Maritime Jurisdiction, promulgated December 6, 1920, 254 U.S. 679 (1920).
26. Note, Admiralty Procedureand Proposalsfor Revision, 61 YALE L.J. 20809 (1952).
27. For a detailed chronology of the changes, see 7A MooRE's, supra note 13
at .21[2].
28. In Miner v. Atlass, the Court held that a district court sitting in admiralty
could not order the taking of an oral deposition for the purpose of discovery only,
insofar as there were no express provisions to that effect in the Admiralty Rules
in force at that time. In light of this, the Court, in its opinion, suggested that those
who advised the Court with respect to the exercise of its rule-making powers
should give attention to this matter. Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641, 651-52 (1960).
29. 7A MooRE's, supra note 13 at .21[3]; see also Preliminary Draft of
Proposed Amendments, The Supervisory Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States (1960).
30. Supreme Court Order of February 28, 1966, 383 U.S. 1029, 1071 (1966).
31. 7A MooRE's, supra note 13 at .01[1].
32. Id. at .90. This statement is in accord with the Advisory Committee's
Note, wherein it is stated:
[t]here is no disposition to inject into the civil practice as it now is the
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It has been stated that "[wihere the identity of the responsible
party is unkown to the party wronged, or where the responsible
party is known to reside overseas, the maritime remedies of arrest
in rem or attachment in personam are indispensible means of redress in United States courts. '33 For over one hundred years, these
procedures were authorized by the Supreme Court Rules despite
the lack of any specific statutory authorization. In Atkins v. The
DisintegratingCo., 3 the Court confirmed its authority to promul-

gate Admiralty Rule 2, the precursor of Supplemental Rule B,
which allowed the acquisition of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant by attachment of his property within the district. Seventy-seven years later, the Court reaffirmed the underlying purpose of the attachment remedy in Re Louisville
3 5 noting that "[tihe process
Underwriters,
of foreign attachment
is known of old in admiralty. It has two purposes: to secure a
respondent's appearance and to assure satisfaction in case the suit
"36
is successful ...
There have been no similar pronouncements in the case law
regarding the right to the remedy of arrest of property in an in rem
proceeding. This is because the right to an in rem remedy and the
right under substantive maritime law to a maritime lien are interdependent and included within the constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction. 37 Nevertheless, where pronouncements have
been made, they have been largely unequivocal.3s Like the admidistinctively maritime remedies ....
The unified rules must therefore
provide some device for preserving the present power of the pleader to
determine whether these historically maritime procedures shall be applica-

ble to his claim or not ....
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTES, supra note 13 at 25.
33. McCreary, Going for the Jugular Vein: Arrests and Attachments in
Admiralty, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 19, 44 (1967).
34. 85 U.S. 272 (1873).
35. 134 U.S. 488 (1889).
36. Id. at 493.
37. See McCreary, Going for the Jugular Vein: Arrests and Attachments in
Admiralty, 28 OHIO ST.L.J. 19, 22-23 (1967).
38. In Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, the Court, in reference to the
in rem remedy, stated that "[s]uch personification of the vessel, treating it as a
juristic person whose acts and omissions, although brought about by her personnel, are personal acts of the ship for which, as a juristic person, she is legally
responsible, has long been recognized by this Court. . . ." 324 U.S. 215 (1945).
The in rem remedy has been discussed by the Court in many different contexts,
but the underlying basis of the remedy-the maritime lien-has remained vir-
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ralty attachment procedure, the maritime action in rem has remained a virtually unchallenged doctrine.3 9
The following discussion will place the issue of the constitutionality of Supplemental Rules B and C into perspective. Initially, the
case law must be looked to for guidance-Sniadach and Fuentes
in somewhat summary fashion because of their relatively longstanding constitutional notoriety, Mitchell and Shaffer in greater
depth because of their more recent vintage and current standing
as "good law." The final portion of this Note will be devoted to
analyzing the current constitutional status of Supplemental Rules
B and C, while highlighting potential problem areas.

II. THE CASE LAW
A.

Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. and Fuentes v. Shevin

The contemporary scrutiny of the constitutionality of state statutes effecting the attachment and garnishment of assets prior to
judgment began with Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,4" arising
out of a decision by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.' Sniadachwas
soon followed by Fuentes v. Shevin.42 Together, these cases represent the early stand taken by the Court in its reexamination of
procedural due process in the debtor-creditor arena.
In Sniadach, the defendant was indebted in the amount of $420
on a promissory note. Defendant's creditor filed a garnishment
complaint alleging her delinquincy on the note, and demanded of
her employer, the garnishee, payment of wages due the defendant.
In accord with Wisconsin law, the employer-garnishee withheld,
subject to order of the court, one-half of wages in its possession due
the defendant. 3 The remaining one-half was paid over to defentually inviolate. See, e.g., Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19
(1960).
39. See McCreary, Going for the Jugular Vein: Arrests and Attachments in
Admiralty, 28 Omo ST.L.J. 19, 23-24 (1967).
40. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
41. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View v. Sniadach, 37 Wis.2d 163, 154
N.W.2d 259 (1967).
42. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
43. When wages or salary are the subject to garnishment action, the garnishee shall pay over to the principal defendant on the date when such
wages or salary would normally be payable a subsistence allowance, out of
the wages or salary then owing, in the sum of $25 in the case of an individual
without dependents or $40 in the case of an individual with dependents; but
in no event in excess of 50% of the wages or salary owing.
Wis.

STAT. ANN.

§ 267.18(2)(a) (Supp. 1969).
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dant as a "subsistence allowance."
Eventually reaching the United States Supreme Court on certiorari, defendant argued that the state prejudgment garnishment
procedure violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment because notice and an opportunity to be heard were not
afforded before the in rem seizure of the wages.44 Under the state
statute in effect at that time, the clerk of the court issued the
summons at the request of the creditor's attorney, who, by serving
the garnishee, was able to freeze the defendant's wages.
The Supreme Court struck down the Wisconsin prejudgment
wage garnishment procedure as a deprivation of property without
due process of law, noting that "the wage earner is deprived of his
enjoyment of earned wages without any opportunity to be heard
and to tender any defense he may have. . . ,,45 Calling wages "a
specialized type of property,"" the Court opposed their prejudgment seizure without notice and a prior hearing because of the
resulting imposition of hardship, and the significant amount of
leverage a creditor may thereby bring to bear on a wage earner.
The Sniadach holding was arguably a narrow one. The Court,
apparently, was merely creating an exception to otherwise lawful
prejudgment seizures-specifically, the garnishment of wages
when no adequate showing of a countervailing state or creditor
interest is made.47 While seemingly indicating continued approval
of the doctrine that private property may indeed be summarily
seized pending a hearing when necessary to effectuate a significant
state interest, Sniadach'sactual effect on attachment and garnishment was more difficult to ascertain. 48
The Supreme Court took a cautious step with its holding in
Sniadach and consequently left two significant questions unanswered. First, was the issue of where the line should be drawn
between property deserving of special protection and "traditional"
property. The second question was under what circumstances may
the more protected category be attached or garnished prior to judgment.
In Fuentes v. Shevin,49 the Court made it clear that
44. 395 U.S. at 338.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 339.
Id. at 340.
Note, Some Implications of Sniadach,70 CoLUM. L. REv. 942, 949 (1970).
Id.

49. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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the necessity of an opportunity for a hearing prior to a taking was
a constitutional requirement that did not depend upon the particular type of summary remedy sought, the particular type of property
involved, the financial status of the debtor, the length of the deprivation, or the severity of collateral consequences. 0
The Fuentes Court manifested its intent to include summary attachment procedures in general within the scope of the Sniadach
rationale. The extraordinary circumstances under which summary
attachment may be constitutionally achieved were specifically distinguished and labelled.
The defendants in Fuentes were delinquent in their payments on
installment contracts entered into in Florida and Pennsylvania.
Both states had statutes authorizing prejudgment replevin actions,
and in both instances, defendants' property had been seized simultaneously with defendants' receipt of complaints seeking repossession of the property through court action.5 As the Court stated, the
primary question in Fuentes was whether the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes were constitutionally defective in failing to provide
for hearings "at a meaningful time. 5 2 The Florida statute allowed
a clerk of the court to issue a writ of replevin summarily, on the
bare assertion of the party seeking the writ that he is "lawfully
entitled to the possession" of the property. 53 In Pennsylvania, the
50. Comment, ForeignAttachment After Sniadach and Fuentes, 73 COLUM.
L. REv. 342, 344 (1973); 407 U.S. at 82, 84-88.
51. Margarita Fuentes had purchased a gas stove and phonograph in Florida.
After consistently making installment payments for more than a year, a dispute
arose over servicing of the stove. The seller brought suit in small claims court
seeking to repossess both the stove and the phonograph. Before Mrs. Fuentes
received a summons to answer its conplaint, the seller obtained a writ of replevin
ordering seizure of the goods at once. Subsequently, Mrs. Fuentes instituted an
action in federal district court challenging the constitutionality of the Florida
prejudgment replevin procedure under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
Simultaneously in Pennsylvania, similarly situated plaintiffs had filed an analogous action in a federal district court, likewise challenging the constitutionality
of that state's prejudgment replevin procedures. In separate proceedings, the
district courts upheld the statutes. On appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, the actions were consolidated for review. See Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F.
Supp. 954 (S.D.Fla. 1970); Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127 (E.D.Pa. 1971).
52. 407 U.S. at 80, quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
53. The applicant was also required to make this assertion in a complaint
initiating a repossession action, and to file a security bond in an amount double
the value of the property to be replevied. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 78.07 (Supp. 19721973).

432

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 12:421

applicant for the writ was not even obliged to initiate a court action
for repossession. 4 In this regard, the Pennsylvania law did not
require that there ever be opportunity for a hearing, before or after
seizure. The most required was that an applicant file an "affidavit
of the value of the property to be replevied."55 The party against
whom the writ was issued was required to initiate a lawsuit himself 6 in order to have his claim heard and adjudicated on the
merits.
The Court held both the Florida and Pennsylvania replevin provisions invalid under the fourteenth amendment as working a deprivation of property without due process of law by denying the right
to a prior opportunity to be heard before chattels are taken from
the possessor." According to the Court, summary procedures of the
type contemplated in the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes are
available in only a few limited situations: (1) when directly necessary to secure an important governmental or general public interest; (2) when there is a special need for very prompt action; and
(3) when the State has kept strict control over its monopoly of
legitimate force, i.e., when the person initiating the seizure is a
governmental official responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it is necessary and justified
in the particular instance." In allowing summary seizure when no
more than private gain is directly at stake, the statutes in question
served no such important governmental or general public interest.59
After Sniadach and Fuentes, it seems apparent that it is contrary to due process and federal policy to permit a state to attach
first and hold a hearing later, even if release by bond can be obtained by the owner of the property." Soon after Fuentes, however,
the Supreme Court ushered in a new phase in its struggle to de54. 407 U.S. at 77-78, n.8.
55. Id. at 78.
56. Id.
57. 407 U.S. at 67-68.
58. Id. at 90-91. The Court cited Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931)
(summary seizure allowed to collect the internal revenue of the United States);
Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (1921) (to meet the needs of a
national war effort); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (vital governmental
interest); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (vital governmental interest); and North American Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306
(1908) (to protect the public from contaminated food).

59. 407 U.S. at 92.
60. 7A MooRE's, supra note 13 at E-454.
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velop satisfactory constitutional standards to govern the debtorcreditor dispute resolution process.6 '
B. Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.
With the decision in Fuentes, it was clear that most creditors'
summary remedies would be constitutionally suspect unless they
could comply with the exception to the notice and hearing requirement stated in the "extraordinary situations" rule.12 It was against

this backdrop that Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.63 was decided, and
surprisingly, the Court sustained a Louisiana sequestration procedure allowing prejudgment seizure without prior notice or opportunity to be heard.
In Mitchell, petitioner had purchased consumer goods from
W.T. Grant Company under an installment sales contract, subsequently defaulting in his payments. W.T. Grant Company filed
suit upon petitioner's default, and in the interim, sought sequestration of the goods purchased by petitioner under the contract.
After W.T. Grant Company had posted bond in double the amount
claimed in its complaint, the trial judge issued the writ, the actual
seizure taking place several days later. At no time prior to seizure
was petitioner given notice of the proceedings or afforded an opportunity to be heard." Petitioner subsequently moved to have the
writ dissolved on constitutional grounds, his challenge being rejected by the Louisiana Supreme Court. 6 There, the court distinguished sequestration from attachment. While attachment became available only when there was an act, actual or anticipated,
by the debtor which would place the creditor at a subsequent disadvantage, sequestration was available on a lesser basis." According to the court, fraud on the part of the debtor was not a prere8
quisite to sequestration.

61. Pearson, Due Process and the Debtor: The Impact of Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant-Part I, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 743, 791 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Pear-

son-Part I].
62. Id. at 744; see also Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and beyond: The
CreditorMeets the Constitution,59 VA. L. REV. 355 (1973); Countryman, The Bill
of Rights and the Bill Collector, 15 Aiz. L. REv. 521 (1973).
63. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
64. W.T. Grant Co. v. Mitchell, 263 La. 627, 269 So.2d 186 (1972). Petition
for writ of sequestration filed by W.T. Grant Co., Feb. 2, 1972.
65. Pearson-Part I, supra note 61 at 747.
66. 263 La. 627, 269 So.2d 186 (1972).
67. 269 So.2d at 190-91.
68. Id. at 190.
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The United States Supreme Court, Justice White writing for the
majority, held that the Louisiana sequestration procedure reflected a constitutionally acceptable accommodation of the competing interests of buyers and sellers, whereby seizure without notice and a prior hearing did not deny the debtor due process of
law."
The terms of the sales contract and the Louisiana statutes were
focal points for the Court in identifying the conflicting rights of
buyer and seller. While the buyer in Mitchell did possess a property interest in the goods seized consistent with the holding in
Fuentes, such interest was "conditional." 7 In other words, until
the purchase price was paid in full, petitioner's interest in the
property was no greater than the surplus remaining. When he defaulted in his payments, whatever interest he had at the time was
subject to defeasance. Correspondingly, and marking Justice
White's divergence from the Fuentes rationale, W.T. Grant's interest, as seller, was measured by the unpaid balance of the purchase
price. 7 While Fuentes had isolated the right to use and possession,
according it a preferred status among other types of property interests, Justice White chose to reduce property interests into abstract
yet quantifiable terms.7" In doing so, the emphasis was on insuring
the ultimate vindication of each party's interest. This "ultimate
vindication of interests" approach made it unnecessary to accord
special protection to a right dubbed "use and possession" pending
a hearing, since all rights would be considered and weighed in the
balance by a court at some point. 3 In short, the right to use and
possession in Mitchell was just another category of property interests.
Of additional concern to the Mitchell Court was the existence of
a vendor's lien under Louisiana law, giving a seller a preference
over all other creditors of the buyer for the price of the goods. 74 On
69. 416 U.S. at 607.
70. Id. at 604.
71. Id.
72. See Pearson-Part I, supra note 61 at 754.
73. Id.
74. Article 3227 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides in part:
He who has sold to another any movable property, which is not paid for,
has a preference on the price of his property, over the other creditors of the
purchaser, whether the sale is made on a credit or without, if the property
still remains in the possession of the purchaser ....
This privilege is to be distinguished from the common law vendor's lien, which

the vendor loses when he delivers possession of the article sold to the vendee.
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the basis of this fact, Justice White concluded that if a seller is to
preserve his priority, "[ilt is imperative when default occurs that
the property be sequestered in order to foreclose the possibility
that the buyer will sell or otherwise convey the property to third

parties.

.

.

. ",15

While it has been ably argued that Justice White's

concern with the issue of the vendor's lien was misplaced," the fact
of its existence was but one of several factors that, in the Court's
view, served to distinguish the facts in Mitchell from those in
Fuentes.
The truly distinguishing features in Mitchell were contained in
the Louisiana statute. Their presence ultimately tipped the balance in favor of the creditor. Three characteristics of the statute
were apparently determinative: (1) the statute provided for judicial supervision of the writ issuing procedure; (2) the statute provided for an immediate post-seizure hearing; and (3) the showing
necessary to obtain sequestration was considerably more exacting
than in Fuentes.77 Because of these procedural protections built
into the Louisiana statute, there was no requirement that an opportunity to be heard precede the actual deprivation. The balance
of competing interests had been achieved. Justice White's flexible
concept of due process, first espoused in his dissent in Fuentes,78
had now achieved acceptance.
The decision in Mitchell was an apparent attempt to circumvent
the earlier Fuentes holding; on the facts the cases are very similar.
The Court seems to have been dissatisfied with Fuentes, choosing
Mitchell to seriously undermine the precedential value of the earlier decision. Similarities between the facts in both cases, however,
necessitated some analytical acrobatics on the part of Justice
White. The net result was a complicated decision that did not
provide the lower courts with that extra measure of guidance so
See DAGGETr, LoUIsiNA PRIVIGES AND CHATrmL MORTGAGES 91 (1942).
75. 416 U.S. at 609.
76. A particularly good discussion, not only of the vendor's lien issue in
Mitchell, but of the entire case and its ramifications, is to be found in Pearson-Part I, cited supra note 61 and throughout this note.
77. 416 U.S. at 605-06.
78. Justice White had filed a dissent in Fuentes noting: (1) that in practical
terms, Fuentes would change little since creditors would now simply specify in
contracts that they would have the right to retake possession upon default; and
(2) that more than just the buyer's property rights were involved in installment
sales contracts.
See Pearson-Part I, supra note 61 at 752-53; Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 97
(1972).
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desperately needed in this changing area of the law. 79
The mechanical litany of controls in the Louisiana statute underwritten by the Court in Mitchell ostensibly provided the
"constitutionally acceptable accommodation of competing interests" now necessary to support a summary prejudgment attachment procedure. The economic analysis in Mitchell, however,
while underscoring the Court's new concern with protecting creditors as well as debtors, still left the admiralty procedures in constitutional limbo. "[T]he admiralty's practice of near-automatically
issuing process in rem and of attachment and garnishment is
nontheless still vulnerable to attack."8 This is largely because the
Mitchell Court declined to note which combination of controls
present in the Louisiana statute would suffice for constitutional
purposes.
Sniadach, Fuentes, and Mitchell altered traditional notions of
procedural due process and gave rise to doubts about the constitutionality of Supplemental Rules B and C. On the other hand, a
second cloud on the availability of in personam attachment and
arrest in rem, in the context of jurisdictional due process, has
81
arisen as a result of the decision in Shaffer v. Heitner.
C.

Shaffer v. Heitner

Shaffer was a stockholder's derivative action brought in Dela79. This fact was pointed up by the "fence-straddling" that took place in
North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601 (1975). In Di-Chem, the
Supreme Court held a Georgia prejudgment garnishment statute unconstitutional, relying on both Fuentes and Mitchell. Justice White actually recharacterized the Fuentes holding, noting that a due process violation was found with
respect to the Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes "because the official
seizures had been carried out without opportunity for hearing or other safeguards
against mistaken repossession." 419 U.S. at 606. The disjunctive phrase "or other
safeguards against mistaken repossession" added something more to the Fuentes
holding than was apparent from the reasoning contained therein. The safeguards
were, of course, those same mechanical controls present in the Louisiana statute
examined in Mitchell. Accordingly, Di-Chem indorsed the Mitchell rationale
while giving lip-service to Fuentes principles. The problem is that after Di-Chem
there is still no consistent understanding of what due process requires, when it is
satisfied, and what purpose it serves.
See Pearson, Due Processand the Debtor: The Impact of Mitchell v. W. T. Grant
Co.-Part I, 29 OKLA.L. REv. 277 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Pearson-Part II];
Scott, Constitutional Regulation of ProvisionalCreditorRemedies: The Cost of
ProceduralDue Process, 61 VA. L. REv. 807, 809 (1975).
80. 7A MooRE's, supra note 61 at E-456.
81. 97 S.Ct. 2569 (1977).
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ware against the Greyhound Corporation, its subsidiary, and
twenty-eight of its then present and former directors. Upon filing
of the complaint, plaintiff simultaneously moved for a writ of sequestration"2 to attach the defendant directors' stock and options
to purchase stock of the parent corporation, 3 all statutorily located
in Delaware. 4 The purpose of the sequestration was to compel the
defendants to enter a general appearance. 5 The defendant directors attempted to enter a special appearance to quash service of
process and to vacate the sequestration, arguing that they had
insufficient minimum contacts8 in Delaware to support the exercise of jurisdiction over them without violating the fourteenth
amendment guarantee of due process. The Delaware Chancery
Court held that the statutory presence of the stock and stock options in Delaware constituted sufficient minimum contacts to permit the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction over the defendants."
The ruling was ultimately affirmed by the Delaware Supreme
Court. 8 The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Marshall, reversed. 9 In its decision the Court extended the
0
minimum contacts test of InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington,"
82. Under DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 10, § 366 (1974), the court may compel the
appearance of a defendant by seizure of his property, such property being subject
to sale under order of the court to pay the demand of the plaintiff.
83. The value of the sequestered stock was approximately $1.2 million.
See 97 S. Ct. at 2574, n.7.
84. See DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 8, § 169 (1974).
85. The statute required a defendant to enter a general appearance or default.
See DEL. CODE AN. Tit. 10, § 366 (1974).
86. The only "contact" the directors had with the state was by virtue of the
company's incorporation there and the fact that pursuant to Delaware law, the
situs of stock, options, and warrants applicable thereto was in Delaware.
87. The court emphasized that the primary purpose of the sequestration statute was not to secure possession of property pending trial, but to compel the
personal appearance of a nonresident defendant to answer and defend a suit
brought against him in a court of equity.
See 97 S.Ct. at 2571.
88. Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225 (1976).
89. 97 S.Ct. at 2569 (1977).
90. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). InternationalShoe expanded the reach of inpersonam
jurisdiction under the various state long-arm statutes, holding it appropriate for
state courts to exercise jurisdiction over nonresident defendants only when the
nonresident has such minimum contacts with the forum that in personam jurisdiction does not violate "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
326 U.S. at 316. Prior to InternationalShoe, state power to exercise jurisdiction
had been based on Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Pennoyer held that every
state possessed exclusive jurisdiction over persons and property within its bor-
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heretofore applicable only to in personam actions, to in rem and
quasi in rem actions, holding that a state may not assert jurisdiction over nonresidents' property not related to the underlying
cause of action unless there exist sufficient minimum contacts
among the parties, the contested transaction, and the forum
state." "In short, state quasi in rem attachment statutes, even
though . . . technically directed only at the property of defendants, will not confer personal jurisdiction on a basis that is distinguishable, on due process grounds, from that considered in
InternationalShoe ....
In Shaffer, the Court recognized three distinct types of in rem
actions: the basic in rem action which affects the interests of all
persons in designated property (typical of actions under Rule C);
quasi in rem actions in which the plaintiff seeks to secure a preexisting claim in the property or to extinguish or establish the
nonexistence of similar interests of other particular persons; and
quasi in rem actions in which the plaintiff seeks to apply what is
conceded to be the property of the defendant to the satisfaction of
a claim against the defendant unrelated to the attached property
(typical of actions under Rule B) . 3 According to the Court, all
three types of in rem actions are subject to the same constitutional
standards, since what is involved in each instance is not simply
jurisdiction over a thing, but jurisdiction over the interests of
persons in a thing. 4 Correspondingly, the principle of
"fundamental fairness" requires that "all assertions of state court
ders, and that no state could exercise jurisdiction over persons or property outside
its territory. On the other hand, Pennoyer also stood for the proposition that a
state could exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident citizen to the extent of his
property within the state.
See 95 U.S. at 722-23; see also Green, JurisdictionalReform in California, 21
HASTINGS L.J. 1219 (1970); Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of
Extended Jurisdictionin Illinois, 1963 U. kLL.L.F. 533; Hazard, A General Theory
of State Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP.CT.REv. 241; Von Mehren & Trautman,
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv.L.REv. 1121 (1966);
Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEx.L.REv. 657 (1959); and Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of PersonalJurisdiction:The "Power" Myth and
Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956).
91. 97 S. Ct. at 2582-84.
92. Maritime Law Association of the United States, Doc. No. 610, Proceedings, Fall Meeting 6776 (November 4, 1977) [hereinafter cited as MLA-No.

6101.
93. See 97 S.Ct. at 2577, n.17, citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246
n.12 (1958).
94. 97 S.Ct. at 2581.
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jurisdiction" comport with InternationalShoe's minimum con-

tacts standard. 5
In scrutinizing the Shaffer facts to determine whether minimum
contacts sufficient to support Delaware jurisdiction existed, the
Court noted that an individual buying securities in a forumchartered corporation did not impliedly consent to that forum's
jurisdiction on every potential cause of action. In this case, not
only was the sequestered property unrelated to the underlying
cause of action, but neither did plaintiff allege, nor was there evidence in the record, that any of the defendant directors had even
been to Delaware. Further, the sequestration statute was not so
narrowly drawn as to indicate that its enactment was predicated
on Delaware's overriding interest in supervising the management
7
of Delaware corporations.1

Prior to Shaffer, assertions of state court jurisdiction over persons and property had been governed by different standards. The
concept of state sovereignty as originally embodied in Pennoyer v.
Nefr8 had sufficed with regard to in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction. The Pennoyer state power theory envisioned every state as
possessing exclusive jurisdiction over persons and property within
its borders. Correspondingly, states could also exercise jurisdiction
over non-resident citizens to the extent of their property within the
state. With the advent of the decision in InternationalShoe, the
Pennoyer state power "myth,"99 as applied to inpersonamjurisdiction, was rejected in favor of minimum contacts. The minimum
contacts test, however, had never been applied to in rem and quasi
in rem jurisdiction prior to Shaffer.'
The procedural and jurisdictional due process mandates of the
Sniadach-Mitchell line and the Shaffer decision represent substantial modifications of prior law. As is typical in common-law
jurisdictions where change is often slowed by the doctrine of stare
decisis, the law as applied in the courts, in many instances lags far
behind the policy as enunciated in the legislatures and "public"
forums of the day. Sniadach, Fuentes, Mitchell, and Shaffer are,
therefore, attempts to bridge the gap between changes in policy
and the actual effect of laws as applied. Courts, however, are
95. Id. at 2584-85.
96.
97.

Id. at 2586.
Id. at 2585.

98. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
99. See note 90 supra.
100. Id.
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restricted to ruling on the facts before them in each case. As a
result, changes in policy can be misconstrued, and thereby misapplied, in areas not contemplated under the limited facts of a particular case. This problem most certainly arises when attempting
to apply the cases under discussion to admiralty law. An area of
the law with so distinctive a practice should not easily be consumed in policy changes that, by and large, affect legal relations
far removed from its concerns. On the other hand, while it is asserted here that the admiralty is indeed so "different" that it
should be taken out of the purview of the decisions discussed, the
constitutional analysis in light of these decisions must still take
place. To be unprepared in the event there appears to be a serious
challenge to the constitutionality of Supplemental Rules B and C
would certainly indicate a complacency on the part of the admiralty bar concerning these extraordinary remedies. This should not
be the case, for in many respects the remedies provided under
Rules B and C are the lifeblood of admiralty practice.
IV.

CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

A.

The ProceduralDue Process Mandate and Supplemental
Rules B and C
The Sniadach-Mitchell line of decisions arguably stand for five
basic propositions in the context of procedural due process: (1)
effective notice to property owners; (2) a meaningful and timely
hearing; (3) avoidance of conclusory allegations in the complaint;
(4) some type of bonding requirement; and (5) judicial supervision
of the writ issuing procedure. It must now be determined whether
the summary and ex parte nature of the procedures provided for
under Supplemental Rules B, C, and E ll' comport with these minimum constitutional requirements.
1. Notice
In most instances, providing personal notice prior to the issuance
of a writ of attachment or in rem arrest can be avoided altogether.
Under Supplemental Rule B(2), however, before a default judgment can be entered and property sold to satisfy a plaintiff's claim,
101. Supplemental Rule E is supplementary to the express provisions of Rules
B, C, and D, and is aimed at those commonly applicable procedures. It is therefore necessary to look at both the specific Rule aimed at the procedure involved
and to the general provisions embraced within Rule E.
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notice must be given to the defendant. The notice requirement
seems geared to the concept of good faith.
Thus, while it might in the ordinary case be unnecessary to check
street directories of a large city to determine if a defendant not listed
in that city's phone book is in fact situated therein, such would
surely not be the case if the plaintiff knew of his own personal
knowledge, or upon fairly reliable authority, that the defendant was
carrying on a business on a particular street in that city." 2
Whether such a standard is sufficiently stringent to comport with
procedural due process requirements is difficult to determine. The
tone of the Advisory Committee's Note pertaining to the notice
provided for in Rule B(2) is ambivalent. Basing its position on
principles enunciated in Harris v. Balk"°3 and Pennoyer v. Neff, '"I
decisions of decidedly questionable import after Shaffer, the Committee's Note ventures to say that no notice is required in attachment proceedings by the principles of due process "since it is assumed that the garnishee or custodian of property attached will
either notify the defendant or be deprived of his right to plead the
judgment as a defense in an action against him by the defendant.' 10 5 The Committee, however, goes on to say that "modern
conceptions of fairness" dictate that notice be given prior to the
rendition of default judgments. 6
On the other hand, that the notice contemplated in Rule B(2)
may be constitutionally sufficient is indirectly implied by the decision in Mitchell. In that case, the favored exception to the prior
notice requirement-i.e., where the spectre of destruction, alienation, or transfer looms large-appears to have special application
to the maritime field. Mitchell, however, was a "balancing-ofinterests" decision where the absence of the necessity for prior
notice was conditioned upon the presence of other safeguards arguably absent from the Rules.
As a matter of practice, most in rem arrests, as well as maritime
attachments, arise from insured claims. The insurance underwriters are usually prepared to provide the necessary security to release the vessel, and in most instances a bond is not required.
Instead, the underwriter furnishes a letter of guarantee without the
102.

7A MooRE's, supra note 13 at B.10, n.2.

103.
104.
105.
106.

198 U.S. 215 (1905).
95 U.S. 714 (1877).
ADvisoRY COMMITTEE NOTES, supra note 13 at 67.
Id.
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actual arrest ever taking place. If, however, the vessel or other
property is not released pursuant to the filing of a bond or letter
of guarantee, notice by publication is required in order that all
persons, including unknown claimants, may appear and be
heard.'07 Since the title conferred in a sale pursuant to a judgment
in rem is "good against the world,"108 it is especially important that
potential claimants be notified in order that any judgment rendered be binding.'09 Accordingly, the nature of the in rem proceeding itself, and the fact that maritime liens are "secret,"'," seems
to militate against a more stringent notice requirement under Rule
C. The notice by publication provision was designed only to insure
"at least constructive notice to lienors and perhaps to owners in
rare cases of neglected property.""'
Vessels registered under the navigation laws of the United States
usually, and in some instances must," 2 record liens thereon with
the United States Coast Guard at the vessel's home port. In other
instances, state law may require licensing of boats and the recording of sellers' security interests. As a result, in virtually all cases
involving vessels, owners' interests are recorded with either federal
or state authorities." 3 In light of this fact,
[I]t has been held that the public records must be checked and the
holders of such recorded interests notified before the default sale of
a vessel in a proceeding in rem, in order to foreclose constitutionally
the holder of the recorded interest, .... .,,
Standing alone, the notice provisions under Supplemental Rules
107. Supplemental Rule C(4).
108. The Trenton, 4 F. 657 (E.D. Mich. 1880).
109. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTES, supra note 13 at 69.
110. The validity of a maritime lien depends neither on possession nor
(except for the preferred ship mortgage, which is statutory) on notice
through filing. It is therefore often referred to as a "secret" lien. It is also
said to be "indelible": that is, since the maritime lien can be executed only
by the admiralty court acting in rem, it is, until that court has so acted,
good "against the world," including the good faith purchaser of the ship
without notice of the lien's existence.
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 9 at 588; see also The Yankee Blade, 60 U.S. 19
(How.) 82, 89 (1857); Piedmont & George's Creek Co. v. Seaboard Fisheries Co.,
254 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1920).
111. Maritime Law Association of the United States, Doc. No. 606, Annual
Meeting 6684-May 6, 1977 [hereinafter cited as MLA-No. 606].
112. E.G., in the case of ship's mortgages.
113. See MLA-No. 606, supra note 111 at 6684.
114. Id.
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B and C, taking into consideration the circumstances of maritime
attachments and in rem arrests, seem to suffice for procedural due
process purposes. The overall constitutional problem, however,
remains. This is due to the fact that the notice provisions cannot
be read as if mutually exclusive of other provisions in the Rules.
2.

Meaningful and Timely Hearings

The right to a hearing, like the right to notice, is a vital component of procedural due process. The fact that the Mitchell Court
condoned, under certain limited circumstances, prejudgment attachments without priornotice and a hearing does not derogate the
constitutional right itself. Instead, in Mitchell as in the case of
Rules B and C, the ultimate issue is one of timeliness.
Under present practice, post arrest and attachment hearings are
available on motion.115 There are no explicit provisions in the Rules
actually providing for hearings, however. The one type of hearing
contemplated in the Rules is a hearing to fix the amount of security. 116 The Fuentes decision initially isolated three prerequisites to
seizure without a prior hearing.'1 7 First, it must be necessary to
secure an important governmental or public interest. Second,
prompt action must be necessary under the circumstances. Third,
the state must maintain control of the procedure. Mitchell, while
on the whole limiting Fuentes, nevertheless echoed these same
requirements. ' In light of this continued endorsement by the Supreme Court of the constitutional right to notice and a hearing
before final deprivations of property can occur, it seems necessary
to explicitly provide for such in the Supplemental Rules. The
Rules should at least provide a mechanism for determining, where
appropriate, whether to allow an attachment or arrest to stand,
and whether to grant a defendant or claimant some countersecurity from a plaintiff.1 9
115. Id.
116. MLA-No. 610, supra note 92 at 6788; see Supplemental Rule E(5).
117. 407 U.S. at 90-91.
118. In upholding the Louisiana procedure, the Mitchell court noted that: (1)
the resolution of conflicting property rights is an important state interest; (2)
prompt action was necessary because the debtor, by transferring possession of the
property, could defeat the vendor's lien of the seller; and (3) Louisiana required
that a judge authorize the writ.
416 U.S. at 604-09; see also Morse, The Conflict Between the Supreme Court
Admiralty Rules and Sniadach-Fuentes:A Collision Course?, 3 FLA. ST. L. REv.
1, 12 (1975).
119. See Note, MaritimeAttachment and Arrest: Facinga Jurisdictionaland
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Amstar Corporationv. M/V ALEXANDROS T'1' is often cited
for the proposition that sufficient opportunity for a hearing now
exists in most districts."' In Amstar, a shipper brought an action
in rem against the M/V ALEXANDROS T and in personam
against the ship's owner to recover damages for losses sustained
when a cargo of raw sugar was delivered in a damaged condition.
Defendants moved to dismiss, contending that the procedures established by Rules A through F of the Supplemental Rules, pursuant to which the ship was arrested and attached, constituted
unconstitutional deprivations of due process under the fifth
amendment. ' The court found defendants' argument unpersuasive since the owners of the vessel were entitled to immediate
postseizure consideration by a judicial officer concerning the validity of the arrest.
The problem with Amstar is that the judicial officer in question,
a Chambers Judge, is always available day and night in the District of Maryland." 3 While he would have had discretion to decide
whether an immediate hearing was necessary, and if so, what standards should apply, procedures in the District of Maryland may
not apply in other jurisdictions.' 4
The well-worn contention that the admiralty practice is so singular as to warrant that some things are "reasonable because they
are necessary"' 25 still retains some vitality. Nevertheless, it does
not seem unreasonable that the Supplemental Rules should be
amended to afford one who has been deprived of his property the
type of postseizure hearing held sufficient in Mitchell.12 Dependence upon the district courts for the promulgation of revised local
ProceduralDue Process Attack, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 153, 168-69 (1978).
120. 431 F.Supp. 328 (D.Md. 1977).
121. See MLA-No. 610, supra note 92 at 6789.
122. 431 F. Supp. at 329.
123. See MLA-No. 610, supra note 92 at 6789.
124. Id. The Amstar court did, however, take note of the decision in Techem
Chemical Co. Ltd. v. M/T Choyo Maru, 416 F. Supp. 960 (D.Md. 1976), wherein
general concern about the quantum of due process accorded under Rules B and
C was evidenced.
See 431 F. Supp. at 332.
125. The Mary, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 126 (1815).
126. See 416 U.S. at 605-06. The sufficiency of the statute there in question
was predicated on its inclusion of various safeguards, including: (1) judicial supervision; (2) immediate post-seizure hearings; and (3) a more exacting showing
necessary to obtain sequestration.
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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admiralty rules might well result in different standards in different
districts. Due process should, of course, mean the same thing in
every district.
3.

Conclusory Allegations and Bonding Requirements

In Jonnet v. DollarSavings Bank of the City of New York,
court stated

27

the

We read Mitchell and Di-chem to require, at a minimum, that the
process cannot be instituted without an affidavit or other sworn
document stating substantially facts on which the cause of action
is predicated, the amount claimed, that the defendant is a nonresi12
dent, and that the defendant has specified property in the state.
As written, Rule B(1) permits attachment or garnishment based
on affidavit of plaintiff or his attorney. In turn, the affidavit may
be based on information and belief.L 9 In Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Company,'31 the court emphasized that motions for attachment may be "ill-suited" for preliminary ex parte determination
where based on information and belief. 31 In practice, such complaints and motions are often based only on conclusory allegations.
Especially in the case of cargo damage claims, plaintiffs frequently
allege only that the cargo was loaded in good order and condition,
but not so discharged, wherefore the plaintiff is damaged. 32 Rule
E(2)(a) further complicates matters by requiring that pleadings
state a cause of action with no greater precision than that required
to survive a motion for more definite statement. The Advisory
Committee Notes made no mention of these facts by way of justification or elaboration.
Again it would not seem to offend traditional notions of admiralty practice to require at least that the standard be up-graded
to that present in the Louisiana statute scrutinized in Mitchell. By
127. 530 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1976) (Pennsylvania foreign attachment statutes
serving the interests of potential plaintiffs only, and providing insubstantial protection to prospective defendants against wrongful attachment held unconstitutional).
128. Id. at 1129.
129. See MLA-No. 610, supra note 92 at 6787.
130. 383 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (New York attachment statute held
unconstitutional to the extent that a New York defendant had no meaningful
opportunity to vacate an order of attachment granted ex parte and without prior
notice).
131. Id. at 650. See discussion in MLA-No. 610, supra note 92 at 6787.
132. MLA-No. 610, supra note 92 at 6787, n.4.
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requiring a statement of the nature of the claim, its amount, and
the grounds relied upon for the issuance of the writ,"' a prophylactic against potential abuse will be provided that neither obscures
nor detracts from the actual right to these extraordinary remedies.
In the area of bonding requirements, the admiralty practice is
in a somewhat unusual circumstance. As noted previously, most
arrests and attachments arise from insured claims where insurance
underwriters are commonly prepared to provide the necessary security to release the vessel.'34 Over the years, the admiralty bar has
developed its own unwritten rules and practices in this area that,
because of the parties, issues, and amounts of money involved,
generally adhere to the highest of standards. Further, procedures
pertaining to the filing, execution, and relinquishment of bonds are
largely uniform. Regardless of the "high state of the art" that the
admiralty has achieved in this regard, defendants whose property
has been attached or arrested are disadvantaged by the present
wording in the Rules. Under Rule E(5), claimants of seized property must post bond or obtain plaintiffs' consent before property
is released. Plaintiffs, of course, will usually decline to do so without security for their claims. In addition, the Rules lack any mechanism designed to insure that the property owner is indemnified
135
in the event of wrongful seizure.
4.

Judicial Supervision of the Writ Issuing Procedure

In Mitchell, the Court viewed judicial control of the ex parte
sequestration procedure as a necessary defense against the wrongful taking of a debtor's property. In effect, the Court read Fuentes
as holding that if the functional equivalent of procedural due process protections had been present in the replevin statutes of Florida and Pennsylvania, then the prior notice and hearing requirements could have been omitted so long as the creditor had a cognizable interest in the property seized in his own right. 35 Judicial
control, then, was one of the functional equivalents present in the
Louisiana statute that swung the balance in favor of allowing the
attachment prior to notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Judicial supervision or participation alone, however, does not
133. I.e., a demonstration by the plaintiff of probable cause for the arrest or
attachment.
See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 605 (1974).
134. See discussion in MLA-No. 606, supra note 111 at 6684.
135. See note 119 supra.
136. See Pearson-Part I, supra note 61 at 785.
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compensate for a lack of notice and prior hearing. A more wellreasoned approach would be to tie in judicial supervision directly
with the right to notice and a hearing. While this would certainly
relegate any truly substantive role played by a judge to postseizure
hearings, this is arguably where not only the hearing, but the judicial participation should occur. The following passage is indicative
of the lack of real justification behind the requirement of prior
judicial supervision of the writ issuing procedure:
While judicial control of summary process is no doubt desireable as
a check against mistake and creditor abuse, the procedure under
review in Mitchell demonstrates why judicial control must be exercised on the basis of definite legal standards. It clearly cannot be
regarded as a panacea for the array of due process problems in
Fuentes. If the issuance of a summary writ is simply a matter of
following a general formula, as is true in Louisiana, the judge is not,
in fact, acting in a judicial capacity. True, his supervision is personal in a physical sense, but it is not meaningful for due process
purposes unless the judge can inquire into or assess the reasons why
summary seizure is necessary in each case. In the absence of such
an inquiry, the benefits of judicial control are virtually nil and the
issuance of summary process becomes more clerical in nature ...
Given these shortcomings, the judge's role in the context of an ex
parte proceeding becomes even more doubtful. . . . It is unrealistic
to expect a judge-who has neither the time nor the perspective-to
bring out facts favorable to the absent debtor's position.'37
The concern with the parameters of procedural due process in
the debtor-creditor area dictates some modification in the present
Supplemental Rules regarding attachments and arrests in rem. As
written, the Rules provide less than the requisite amount of procedural safeguards required to insure a constitutional accommodation of conflicting interests in every instance. With the present
state of affairs, the door is open to radical change in the Rules
because of their enunciated deficiencies. It would be far better to
institute minor changes as a precautionary measure against later
substantive changes that might possibly eradicate, for all intents
and purposes, the right to these remedies peculiarly maritime in
nature.
B.

JurisdictionalDue Process and Shaffer

Maritime attachments and actions in rem can be readily distin137. Id. at 789-90.

.148
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guished by the amount of jurisdictional power they vest in a court.
In a proceeding begun by attachment, the ultimate judgment is
conclusive only in reference to the defendant's interest in the property attached or in the obligation of the garnishee to the defendant. 3 ' Actions in rem vest a court with jurisdiction to issue a
binding judgment affecting the interests of all persons in the property, not subject to collateral attack. 9 While significantly different in the extent of jurisdictional power conferred, both procedures, as a threshold matter, allow courts to assert jurisdiction over
persons with interests in seized property, whether such persons are
actually before the court or not.
Admiralty has long held that an in rem action could be commenced in any district where the offending res was physically
situated or into which it would come pending suit; and that an in
personam attachment could be commenced in any district in which
the defendant has goods, chattels, credits or effects. The propriety
of the action did not depend upon the contacts the defendant or
owner of the property had with the district, but was dependent
1
only upon the physical presence of the affected property. 40
The constitutionality of assertions of jurisdiction based on the
presence of property is now arguably controlled by the Supreme
Court's decision in Shaffer v. Heitner.4 ' The question that must
now be addressed is whether Supplemental Rules B and C as a
means of asserting jurisdiction, exceed the limits of jurisdictional
due process.
The Shaffer opinion, while containing general statements regarding in rem jurisdiction in a generic sense, has its greatest potential impact on certain quasi in rem actions of the type contemplated in Rule B. Specifically, these would be actions in which the
plaintiff seeks to apply what is conceded to be property of the
defendant to the satisfaction of a claim unrelated to the attached
property. Also encompassed within the purview of Shaffer are
basic in rem actions of the type contemplated in Rule C.
The Shaffer Court determined that in all instances "the basis
for jurisdiction must be sufficient to justify exercising 'jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing.' "112 The Court had,
with this determination, acknowledged that, as Justice Holmes
138. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 76 (1942).
139. Id. at § 2, comment a (1942).
140. 7A MOORE'S, supra note 13 at E-456.
141. 97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977).
142. Id. at 2582.
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had said at the turn of the century, "[A]Ill proceedings, like all
rights, are really against persons.""' The consequence of the
acknowledgment is that the International Shoe minimum contacts standard now applies in all assertions of jurisdiction-not
only to in personam actions as before, but to in rem and quasi in
rem actions as well.
In the final analysis, however, careful scrutiny reveals Shaffer to
be a narrow holding premised on broad principles. Local registration of corporate stock provided defendants' only contact with the
forum in Shaffer. In addition, plaintiff's use of the Delaware sequestration statute put defendants in the unenviable position of
either coming into Delaware and defending on the merits, or suffering a default judgment to the extent of the value of the attached
' The facts are distinguishable from those usually operative
stock. 44
in both in rem and attachment proceedings in admiralty. In in rem
arrest situations, of course, the action lies against the physically
present res itself. In addition, in attachment situations, Supplemental Rule E(8) provides for limited or restricted appearances. It
is doubtful, however, whether these distinctions alone suffice to
insure the continued constitutionality of the Rules from the standpoint of jurisdictional due process. In fact, it initially appears that
they do not, for the Court in Shaffer specifically stated that "if a
direct assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant would
violate the Constitution, it would seem that an indirect assertion
of that jurisdiction [i.e., by attaching property of the defendant
unrelated to the cause of action by virtue of its fortuitous presence
within a court's territorial jurisdiction] should be equally impermissable." 45
Language in Shaffer such as that quoted above has convinced
some that Rule B and C procedures currently stand on tenuous
constitutional grounds. While constitutional problems may exist
with respect to these Rules, a close examination of Shaffer exposes
several statements that, although not specifically addressed to
admiralty and maritime procedures, evidence a continued regard
for the efficacy of such summary ex parte actions under proper
circumstances.
In announcing that the standard for determining whether the
exercise of jurisdiction over interests of persons in a thing, consis143. Tyler v. Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 76, 55 N.E. 812, 814 (1900),
appeal dismissed 179 U.S. 405 (1900).
144. See note 85 supra.
145. 97 S. Ct. at 2583.
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tent with the due process clause, is the minimum contacts standard, the Court immediately qualifies its holding, noting
[t]his argument, of course, does not ignore the fact that the presence of property in a State may bear on the existence of jurisdiction
by providing contacts among the forum State, the defendant, and
the litigation."'
In Shaffer, the Court was contemplating true in rem actions of the
type provided for pursuant to rule C, and quasi in rem actions
where claims to the property itself are the source of the controversy.'47 Additionally, the Court noted that a state's interest in
assuring a procedure for the peaceful resolution of disputes about
the possession of property within its territory, as well as the fact
that important records and witnesses may be found within its borders, would also support jurisdiction."' More importantly, however, in a footnote the Court states that its holding does not consider "the question whether the presence of a defendant's property
in a State is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction when no other forum
is available to the plaintiff."'4 The Court even felt compelled to
add that while not decisive, "history must be considered as supporting the proposition that jurisdiction based solely on the presence of property satisfies the demands of due process ..

.150 The

foregoing language should inure to the benefit of procedures under
Rule B in the appropriate instance.
On the other hand, quasi in rem actions where the property
attached is unrelated to the underlying cause of action precipitated the Shaffer decision. Nevertheless, it also appears that such
actions are the root of equivocal language in the opinion. Landmark decisions are often rendered in this manner, revealing that
such decisions do not generally attempt to change the course of the
law in one stroke. As is more often the case, they reflect an underlying policy change in the law as applied. Shaffer tracks this customary procedure, leaving the way paved for further refinements in the
law pursuant to the official change in policy. Because Shaffer is a
reasonably sound opinion that studiously avoids blanket generalizations, quasi in rem procedures pursuant to Rule B may still be
constitutionally vindicated.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 2582.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2584, n.37.
Id. at 2584.
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In admiralty, the entity exercising jurisdiction is the United
States, rather than an individual state. Conversely, International
Shoe was concerned with constitutional limitations on the exercise
of sovereign state power under the fourteenth amendment. Shaffer
also deals with state court jurisdiction, and it is therefore necessary
to translate its treatment of the state jurisdiction issue into federal
terms. 5'
Where the federal court's jurisdiction has been invoked upon the
basis of federal question or admiralty jurisdiction, however, the substantive law is, of course, federal and the assertion of power is thus
exclusively federal. Rule 4 still, however, imports state procedures
for making service of process. Some courts have tended simply to
apply InternationalShoe standards to such cases without attaching
weight to the consideration that it is the Fifth Amendment due
process clause which is relevant to federal question and admiralty
cases rather than the Fourteenth Amendment152 due process clause
under which InternationalShoe was decided.
In Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 5 3 an admiralty action against an
alien corporation seeking pecuniary loss for the death of plaintiff's
wife pursuant to the Death on the High Seas Act,' the court noted
that although as applied to the states, the constitutional test for
personal jurisdiction involves a determination of whether the defendant has certain minimal contacts with the forum state, the
appropriate inquiry when suit is based upon a federally created
right is whether the defendant has certain minimal contacts with
the United States, in order to satisfy due process requirements
under the fifth amendment. 5 Similarly, in First Flight Company
v. National Car Loading Corporation,"'the court stated:
What has frequently been overlooked is that this same basic principle has long been applied to the United States itself, so that the
United States is deemed to have personal jurisdiction over any defendant within the United States. Because of this oversight, and by
analogy to the application of the basic principle to the states, there
is a line of cases apparently denying the validity of an exercise of
151. MLA-No. 610, supra note 92 at 6777.
152. Id. at 6778.
153. 355 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich. 1973).
154. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761 et. seq. (1920).
155. 355 F. Supp. at 357. See also Edward J. Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire
& Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp. 381 (1967); Alco Standard Corp. v. Benalal, 345 F.
Supp. 14 (E.D.Pa. 1972).
156. 209 F. Supp. 730 (E.D.Tenn. 1962).
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personal jurisdiction by a federal court over a defendant present
within the United States unless the defendant is also present (or
"doing business," etc.) within the district in which the court is held.
In other words, the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment upon
state jurisdiction have been applied by these cases to federal jurisdiction. The anomaly here lies not only in overlooking the principle
that the United States may exercise personal jurisdiction over any
defendant within the United States, but also in limiting federal
action by a constitutional provision applicable only to state action." 7'
Where federal courts have seen fit to apply the fifth rather than
fourteenth amendment, the result has been a less stringent minimum contacts standard. In these instances, courts have used an
"aggregate contacts with the United States" approach, the assumption being that a foreign defendant has little reason to prefer
one district over another.' The corollary of this assumption is that
if a foreign defendant does have such a preference, he probably also
has sufficient contacts with the United States in some particular
district. 5 9 This is not to say, however, that "aggregate contacts"
is so lenient a standard that it will foreclose the possibility of
defeating a court's attempt at asserting jurisdiction on the basis
thereof. Grevas v. M/V Olympic Pegasus' emphasizes this fact.
In Grevas, a Greek seaman brought an action in Virginia against
a vessel and its owner to recover for personal injuries sustained in
an accident on board ship. The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the action for lack of in
personam jurisdiction over the owner. In upholding the dismissal,
the court of appeals noted that the few activities in which defendant engaged in Virginia were derived from a single visit not
amounting "to contacts sufficient to subject defendant to in personam jurisdiction.
...
"I' Accordingly, it can be assumed that
federal courts can consistently apply an "aggregate contacts" test
in the proper federal context without abusing principles of fundamental fairness. If so, the procedures contemplated in Supplemental Rules B and C can retain their constitutional validity while
simultaneously adhering to the Shaffer mandate without any truly
157. Id. at 736-37.
158. MLA-No. 610, supra note 92 at 6779.

159. Id.
160.

557 F.2d 65 (4th Cir. 1977).

161. Id. at 68.
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substantive or radical changes being made in these historically
maritime remedies.
V.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

While it cannot be unequivocally stated that Supplemental
Rules B and C are unconstitutional in light of the SniadachMitchell series of cases and the Shaffer decision, several problem
areas have been isolated in the Rules. In the procedural due process context, the more critical problem areas seem to occur regarding the issues of timely hearings, and the propensity for conclusory
allegations based on information and belief commonly found in
pleadings filed pursuant to Rules B and C.
In the immediate aftermath of Sniadach and Fuentes, prejudgment attachments were arguably unconstitutional where defendants had no prior opportunity to be heard. "Moreover, Fuentes
made clear that the fact the affected property or right could be
regained pending ultimate resolution on the merits by the posting
of a bond was not a sufficient cause to dispense with the pre-taking
hearing or something akin thereto."'' The only instance in which
such a summary procedure was available was under the
"extraordinary situations" rule, characterized by: (1) the presence
of an overriding governmental or public interest; (2) a need for
prompt action; and (3) state control of the procedure. The Mitchell
decision abandoned the rigid Fuentes scheme in favor of a flexible
due process concept, holding that seizures without notice and a
prior hearing need not invariably deny a debtor due process of
law.' While relaxing the overall due process standards from those
enunciated in Fuentes, however, the Mitchell opinion indorsed the
presence of certain safeguards in the Louisiana statute, which safeguards-judicial supervision of the writ issuing procedure, provision for immediate post-seizure hearings, and substantive pleading
(i.e., based on something more than conclusory allegations)-but
counterbalancesthe need for a hearing prior to an actual deprivation of property. In other words, the right to a prior hearing may
be dispensed with where adequate countermeasures are provided
by statute, court rule, or, arguably, where extenuating circumstances would indicate a need for such summary action.
Under the Supplemental Rules, the absence of adequate provi162. 7A MOORE'S, supra note 13 at E-454; see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67,
84-85 (1972).
163. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 607 (1974).
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sions regarding hearings is made more conspicuous by a corresponding lack of other countermeasures provided in lieu thereof. There
is no provision for judicial participation in the commencement of
actions under Rules B and C, and conclusory allegations based on
information and belief are the rule rather than the exception in
pleadings. While justification for the former provision may be lacking,'6 4 the latter is a function of statutory direction, insofar as Rule
E(2)(a) dictates that pleadings state a cause of action with no
greater precision than that required to survive a motion for more
5
definite statement.1
In the jurisdictional due process area, the Shaffer decision especially creates additional problems for Supplemental Rule B. Maritime prejudgment attachments, like the sequestration procedure
in Shaffer, are most commonly instituted against property unrelated to the underlying cause of action, a situation which helped
precipitate the Shaffer holding. In sum, if Mitchell and Shaffer
were today held expressly applicable to admiralty actions commenced under Supplemental Rules B and C, it is likely that both
Rules would be found contitutionally deficient not only as applied,
but as written.
On the other hand, a persuasive argument in favor of the continued constitutionality of the Rules lies in the historical policy considerations underlying the admiralty practice.
On the subject particularly under consideration, it appears from an
English writer, that the practice of issuing attachments had been
discontinued in the English courts of admiralty, while in some of our
own courts it was still in use, perhaps not so generally as to sanction
our sustaining it altogether on authority, were we not of opinion,
that it has the highest sanction also, as well in principle as convenience. 6'
While ships and the shipping industry have grown immeasureably
since these words were uttered by the Supreme Court in Manro v.
Almeida, the underlying reasoning for the statement remains
apropos.
The maritime prejudgment attachment provisions were preserved in the Supplemental Rules in order that due deference be
given to the transient nature of the shipping industry. Rule B
accordingly enables a claimant to obtain jurisdiction over credits
164.
165.
166.

See infra notes 128-133 and accompanying text.
Id.
Manro v. Almeida, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 473, 489 (1825).
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and effects of a defendant "in any number of places where these
may be attached or garnished, although the defendant's residence
or place of business may be halfway around the world,...1.6I7
Claimants thereby circumvent many of the jurisdictional and
venue problems confronting terrestrial plaintiffs.
Proceedings in rem were preserved in the Supplemental Rules
for many of the same reasons, and additionally, because such actions are derived from the ancient maritime codes promulgated in
the eastern Mediterranean before the rise of the Roman Empire.
It was from such codes that the general maritime law of the United
States, with, of course, an English influence, was derived.
Today, as in the distant past, a ship may be in one location for
only a very short time. Those who provide services or who travel
with the ship should be provided with a mechanism whereby they
can have assurances that any legitimate claim inuring to their
benefit can be resolved. Supplemental Rules B and C provide just
such a mechanism. That the procedures contemplated thereunder
are less than sound from a constitutional standpoint, where the
constitutional standard is premised on "land-based" principles,
begs the question. There would be no need for a separate body of
admiralty law and procedure if the subject-matter contemplated
was of the same nature as that involved in Mitchell and Shaffer.
Of additional significance is the fact that the admiralty rules are
to be, and always have been, promulgated by the Supreme Court.
If the Court has the responsibility for mandating the procedures
to be followed in admiralty actions, it would seem that it would
have long since modified practice under the Supplemental Rules
to comport with the holdings in the cases discussed. In the area of
the Supplemental Rules, there are decidedly fewer constraints on
Supreme Court action. For instance, there is no need to await the
appropriate case before dictating change in the Rules. Likewise,
there is no need to depend on Congressional action or inaction to
precipitate a ruling by the Court. Finally, one is hardpressed to
assume that the Court, in rendering its decisions in Sniadach,
Fuentes, Mitchell, and Shaffer, was totally oblivious to the ramifications such holdings would have for the admiralty practice. It is
correspondingly apparent that the Court deemed it necessary to
mention the admiralty practice because the admiralty practice is
"different."
On the other hand, there is room for improvement in the proce167.

7A MooRE's, supra note 13 at .90.
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dures provided for under Rules B and C. Without detracting from
the necessarily extraordinary maritime remedies, the Rules should
be updated to eliminate argument regarding their constitutionality. Policy arguments espousing the peculiarity of the admiralty
practice, while well founded and persuasive, may be insufficient in
the eyes of many courts. Rather than taking the chance that a
court may rule "erroneously" on the constitutionality of Rule B or
C procedures, preventive measures seem to be in order.
Jon L. Goodman

